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推荐阅读-Why the Bailout Plan Would Be a Disaster

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2008-10-10 11:59:00

John Cochrane on Why the Bailout Plan Would Be a Disaster



这篇文章发表在WSJ的网站上。John H. Cochrane 是芝大经济和经融学教授。我上过他的课,是个真正得才兼备的学着。他的这篇文章深入浅出,解释了目前危机存在的原因,为什么刚刚通过的bailout plan是个灾难,以及怎样才能解决危机的核心问题。建议大家阅读。


 


The Monster Returns
By John H. Cochrane

Like a monster from an old horror movie, the Treasury plan keeps coming back from the dead. Yes, we are in a financial crisis that needs urgent, determined, and clear-eyed help from the government. But this plan is fundamentally flawed. It won’t even work if we leave aside its horrendous cost and long-lasting damage to the financial system. The additions and sweeteners in the Senate version, and those on the table in the house, make it even less likely to work.


A workable plan has to be based on fundamentally different principles: recapitalizing banks that are in trouble, including allowing orderly failures, and providing liquidity to short-term credit markets. These are not new and untested ideas; these are the tools that governments have used for 100 years to get through financial turmoil. However, they have to be used in forceful and decisive ways that will step on a lot of powerful toes.


 


The Problem


 


The heart of the problem now, as best as anyone I know can understand it (we are all remarkably long on stories and remarkably short on numbers), is that many banks hold a lot of mortgages and mortgage-backed securities whose values have fallen below the value of money the banks have borrowed. The banks are, by that measure, insolvent. Credit market problems are a symptom of this underlying problem. Nobody really knows which banks are in trouble and how badly, nor when these troubles will lead to a sudden failure. Obviously, they don’t want to lend more money.


A credit crunch is the danger for the economy from this situation. Banks need capital to operate. In order to borrow another dollar and make a new loan, a bank needs an extra, say, 10 cents of its own money (capital) — so that if the loan declines in value by 10 cents, the bank can still pay back the dollar it borrowed. If a bank doesn’t have enough capital — because declines in asset values wiped out the 10 cents from the last loan — it can’t make new loans, even to credit-worthy customers. If all banks are in this position (a much less likely event), we have a credit crunch. People want to save and earn interest; other people want to borrow to finance houses and businesses; but the banking system is not able to do its match-maker job.



Solving the Problem


 


O.K., if this is the problem, then banks need more capital. Then the people, computers, buildings, knowledge, and so forth that represent the real businesses can borrow money again and start lending it out. The core of any plan must be to recapitalize the banking system. How?


Issue stock — either in offerings, in big chunks as Goldman Sachs famously did with Warren Buffett last week, or by merging or selling the whole company. There are trillions of dollars of investment capital floating around the world, happy to buy banks so long as the price is good enough. Banks don’t want to issue stock because it seems to dilute current stockholders, and it might “send bad signals.” Lots of sensible proposals amount to twisting their arms to do so. In many previous “bailouts,” the government added small (relative to $700 billion!) sweeteners to get deals like this to work.


Let banks fail, but in an orderly fashion. When a bank “fails,” it does not leave a huge crater in the ground. The people, knowledge, computers, buildings, and so forth are sold to new owners — who provide new capital — and business goes on as usual; a new sign goes in the window, new capital comes in the back door, and new loans go out the front door. Current shareholders are wiped out, and some of the senior debt holders don’t get all their money back. They complain loudly to Congress and the administration — nobody likes losing money — but their losses do not imperil the financial system. They earned great returns on the way up in return for bearing this risk; now they get to bear the risk.


We saw this process in action last week. On Monday, we heard many predictions that the financial system would implode in a matter of days. At the end of the week, JPMorgan took over Washington Mutual. Depositors and loan customers didn’t even notice.


As someone who argued publicly against the Treasury plan on Monday, I felt vindicated.


This process does need government intervention; “in an orderly fashion” is an important qualifier. Our bankruptcy system is not well set up to handle complex financial institutions with lots of short-term debt and with complex derivative and swap transactions overhanging. Until that gets fixed, we have to muddle through.


An important long-run project will be to redesign bankruptcy; delineate which classes of creditors get protected (depositors, brokerage customers, some kinds of short-term creditors) and how much regulation that protection implies; and design a system in which shareholders and debt holders can lose the money they put at risk without creating systemic risk. But not now.


What is simple to describe economically — wipe out shareholders, write down debt, marry the operations to new capital — is not straightforward legally and institutionally. If we just throw everyone into bankruptcy court, the lawyers will fight it out for years and the operations really will grind to a halt. In the heat of the crisis, we need the same kind of greasing of wheels and twisting of arms that went into the last few bank failures.


Fancy ideas. The main point of any successful plan is to marry new capital with bank operations. There are lots of creative ways to do this, including forced debt-equity swaps and various government purchases of equity. (My colleagues at the University of Chicago are particularly good at coming up with clever schemes.)


The second part of the solution is to maintain liquidity of short-term credit markets. The Fed is very good at this. Its whole purpose is to be “lender of last resort.” We are told that “banks won’t borrow and lend to each other.” But banks can borrow from the Fed. The Fed is practically begging them to do so. Even if interbank lending comes to a halt, there need not be a credit crunch. If banks are not making new loans, it is because they either do not have capital, or they don’t want to; not because they can’t borrow overnight from other banks. (And the “other banks” are still there with excess deposits.) If the Fed is worried about commercial paper rates, it can support those.


The one good part of the current proposals is a temporary extension of federal deposit insurance. The last thing we need is panicky individuals rushing needlessly to ATM machines.


By analogy, we are in a sort of “run” of short-term debt away from banks. We have learned in this crisis that the whole financial system is relying to an incredible extent on borrowing new money each day to pay off old money, which leads quickly to chaos if investors don’t want to roll over. It doesn’t make sense to threaten that overnight debt winds up in bankruptcy court, which is at the heart of the need for government to smooth failures.


In the short run, guaranteeing new short-term credit to banks as a sort of deposit insurance could stop this “run.” If we do that, of course, we will have to limit how much banks and other financial institutions can borrow at such short horizons in the future.



Banks vs. the Banking System


 


Banks can fail without imperiling the crucial ability of the banking system to make new loans. If a bank fails, wiping out its shareholders, and its operations are quickly married to the capital of new owners, the banking system is fine. Even if one bank shuts down — so long as there are other competing banks around who can make loans — the banking system is fine.


I think many observers, and quite a few policy makers, do not recognize the robustness that our deregulated competitive banking system conveys. If one bank failed in the 1930’s, a big out-of-state bank could not come in and take it over. Hedge funds, private equity funds, foreign banks, and sovereign wealth funds didn’t even exist — and if they did, there’s no way they would have been allowed to own a bank or even substantial amounts of bank stock. If a bank failed in the 1930’s, a competitive bank could not move in and quickly offer loans or deposit and other retail services to the first bank’s customers. JPMorgan could not have taken over WaMu. But all those competitive mechanisms are in place now — at least until a new round of regulation wipes them out. This is, I think, the reason why we’ve had nine months of historic financial chaos, and only now are we starting to see real systemic problems.


There is a temptation for regulators and government officials to hear stories of woe from failing banks, their creditors, and their shareholders, and mistakenly believe that these particular people and institutions need to be propped up.


 


The Treasury Plan


 


The Treasury plan is a nuclear option. The only way it can work to solve the central problem, recapitalizing banks, is if the Treasury buys so many mortgages that we raise mortgage values to the point that banks are obviously solvent again.


To work, this plan has to raise the market value of all mortgage-backed securities. We don’t just help bad banks; we bail out good banks (really their shareholders and debt holders), hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, university and charitable endowments – everyone who made money on mortgage-backed instruments in good times and signed up for the risk in bad times. This is the mother of all bailouts.


There is a storm out on the lake, and some of the boats are in trouble. Commodore Bernanke has been helping to bail water from some boats until they can patch themselves up, encouraging other sound boats to help, and transferring passengers on sinking boats to others. But it’s getting tough and the storm is still raging.


Someone had a great idea: let’s blow up the dam and drain the lake! O.K., it might stop the boats from sinking, but there won’t be a lake left when we’re done. That’s the essence of the Treasury plan.


Short of that, it will not work. Suppose a bank is carrying its mortgages at 80 cents on the dollar, but the market value is 40 cents. If the Treasury buys at 40 cents or even 60 cents on the dollar, the bank is in worse trouble than before, since the bank has to recognize the market value. Unless the Treasury pushes prices all the way past 80 cents on the dollar up to 90 cents or even 100 cents, we haven’t done any good at all; and $700 billion is a drop in the bucket compared what that would take.


There is a lot of talk about “illiquid markets,” “price discovery,” and the “hold to maturity price.” The hope is that by making rather small purchases, the Treasury will be able to raise market prices a lot. This is a vain hope — at least it is completely untested in any historical experience. Never in all of financial history has anyone been able to make a small amount of purchases, establish a “liquid market,” and substantially raise the overall market price.


Since the Treasury will not be able to raise overall market prices, it will end up buying from banks that are in trouble, at prices fantastically above market value. This is transparently the same as simply giving the banks free money. Make sure the taxpayers get a thank-you card.


There is other talk (reflected in the Senate bill) of abandoning mark-to-market accounting — i.e., to pretend assets are worth more than they really are. This will not fool lenders who are worried about the true value of the assets. If anything, they will be less likely to lend. Conversely, if prices are truly artificially low, then potential lenders to banks will know this and will lend anyway. We might as well just ban all accounting if we don’t like the news accountants bring. No, we need more transparency, not less.


Many of the changes in new versions of the bill make matters worse, at least for the central task of stabilizing financial markets.


The Senate adds language to protect homeowners: “help families to keep their homes and to stabilize communities.” That’s natural; a political system cannot hope to bail out shareholders to the tune of $700 billion dollars without bailing out mortgage holders on the other end. But it makes the bank-stabilization problem much worse. Mortgages are worth a lot less if people don’t have to pay them back. This will directly lower the market value of the mortgages that we’re trying to raise.


Yes, we need to do something. But “doing something” that will not work — with potentially dire consequences — is not the right course, especially when sensible and well-understood options remain.


[此贴子已经被作者于2008-10-10 12:19:22编辑过]

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2008-10-10 14:35:00

以下是引用Caffeine在2008-10-10 13:21:00的发言:
when was the article written? Lots of arguments look out of date although there are lots of very good points made. I won't repeat the words I agree on, but here are my thoughts.

The fed has said that they will recap banks directly. (it has not worked in Europe after two days, btw). I think that the Professor failed to recognized one behavior pattern of banks: When they need 10c and get 10c, they won't lend. Even when they get 20c, they will keep the 20c. Or at the very least 18c. That is exactly what's happening in the market right now. All dealer desks are very tight on financing. Hedge funds are being squeezed on margin calls and no new trades can be financed by dealers. That's why we're seeing the stock market crashing. It's de-leveraging, just like a drug user experiencing withdrawal. Direct capitalization won't work in this kind of market, especially before year end. It helps that banks won't fail. But it won't make them lend.

On "failure in an orderly fashion". He used WAMU as an example. Yes, depositors didn't even notice. That's because he is not a bond investor! If he ever owns a piece of senior unsecured debt from WAMU, he will curse the government for wiping out the bond holders. It is also a terrible transaction because they single handedly slashed all unsecured corporate debt price. Everybody was hurt and nobody will feel comfortable lending to corporates again. Just what the market needs huh?

I agree with him that many troubled institutions must fail. Unfortunately the current government is afraid of failing banks due to its own vulnerable balance sheet. The Fed has injected so much liquidity via many channels, but so far it hasn't worked.



 


发表于10月2日。文章完成的时间应该在10月1日或2日吧。


 


我经济学一般,所以本来对当下危机的由来,如何解决这类问题,以及bailout plan行不行得通一知半解。我觉得看了这篇文章,我对这些问题有了新的认识,而且同意他的观点。所以转过来,觉得也许会对一些人有用。当然,每个人对事物的看法都是不一样的,尤其是经济学,很多理论和实践都一直有争议。


 


至于你反对的关于10c 注资例子的观点,我觉得你没有理解他文章里那个例子。10c是equity,而不是asset。我觉得你的理解这10c是属于asset。


 


关于WAMU的bond holder。我同意作者的观点,bond holder投资失败,我决不同情他们。在投资的时候,没有好好查看投资对象的资贷状况,是他们自己的责任。没有其他任何人应该替他们负责。


 


市场的credit crunch,equity market free fall,对这些问题bailout plan没有丝毫的帮助。作者认为长期也不会有帮助。至于他提出的建议,及历史上证明有效的方法这次是否会奏效,很难说,至少我个人认为短期也不会避免credit crunch和股市的大熊市。但是,恶因早已种下,即过于宽松的landing policy,以及high leverage等等,现在的credit crunch,熊市只能说必然的。这个bailout plan就好像给大脓疮贴创可贴,于事无补。而作者提出的解决方案是相对公平得多,我认为也可行得多的方案。


 


 


 


 

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2008-10-10 22:52:00

以下是引用Caffeine在2008-10-10 14:59:00的发言:
另外mm知道还有一个原因,为什么银行不借贷?因为很多弱银行早晚要到,倒了以后,活下来的银行可以用50c/$买loans,而不是去originate at par.所以现在有多少钱就存多少钱。如果TARP开始运转,可以加速弱银行倒闭。积累了子弹的银行就可以买troubled assets了。现在谁往外借钱就是自掘坟墓。
银行hoard cash这种行为,是经济学里面讲的。也是现在的实情。

 


这个说法我同意。所以该倒的银行应该倒闭,才能结束这个循环啊教授提出的就是要orderly让银行倒闭。


 


教授在问中提出了建议啊,他说与其Fed和政府花巨资(需要的远远远远超过700B)来买MBS来使得银行们变得solvent,不如让那些有坏资产的银行倒闭,然后给资产相对健康的银行注资,让他们正常运营。我认为,这才是解开你上面所说死结的根本办法。


 


另外,那些投了wamu或LEH bond的fund不能算风险低的吧。既然是风险,就要承担啊。况且,wamu和LEH的increased credit spreads indicate their poor credit worthiness也不是一天两天了。早在bear sterns被JP买的同时,就有为数不少的hedge fund 来砸LEH,因为他们早已看出LEH承担的风险导致的必然结果。


 


 

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2008-10-10 23:58:00

以下是引用Caffeine在2008-10-10 23:13:00的发言:

不过比较凑巧的是,这个plan里面才让FDIC有和treasury借大钱的能力。以前才有30-60bn,根本受不了银行倒闭的。要不然让jp那么吃掉wamu.orderly倒闭必须有前提,是FDIC有能力take the banks.没那个人人憎恨的package,FDIC也没钱啊。另外这一步,是最后一步的做法。没招了才用这个。详细步骤见1933年的bank holidays. 不到最后一步,不会出这么恨得招。因为这样子倒掉的,往往是小的community banks,往往是居住在比较偏远的老百姓受的伤害最大。从政策角度比较难办。在bank holiday期间,社会动荡也是一个很不确定的危险。另外LEH这种,怎么办也无法orderly.所谓orderly,理论是正确的,实际太难实施了。 你说的bond risk, again,是对的。但是呢,一般来讲bond holders是creditors.买bond,当然要看破产可能性,也要看破产后court能给请出来多少钱。bond holders和equity holders的权利截然不同,在破产court里面,bond holders权利很大的。如果wamu这种公司破产的话,bond好比能值60分,那么这个政府的干预就是抹掉了60分的价值。政府这样干预,更没有银行乐意给公司贷款了。原因很简单,类似wamu的事情再出一次,谁也不乐意当倒霉蛋。之所以政府救市,就是为了让市场活跃起来,银行开始放贷;但是这种救法,完全打消了任何人投资的积极性。所以从政策来讲是失败的。承担corporate 风险,和承担政策风险,我认为是两回事儿。如果政策风险大到这个程度,政策就是失败的市场干预。任何芝加哥的人都不会同意这样子的政策的。我觉得教授并没有看到这个做法的负面影响(如果就是一个老百姓,偏偏自己也没有投资到有这个bond 的fund,那是看不到的。教授也不合bond traders聊天,他也听不到这种声音)。而市场是看到了的。现在MS的CDS要快25c upfront,这样子也是在伤害MS.上一个政策,直接影响到其他公司的利益。

 


希望这些权威借到的钱不是象plan里说的那样用来跟银行买MBS,因为怎么也不会够的。


你说的那个bond holder被wipe out,是所有的bond holders including most senior吗?具体情况我不清楚,但是最senior的债权人应该是depositors。如果资产除了偿还depositors,其他全部被wipe out,那么我觉得bond holder就是不应该得一分钱。


不错,bond holder是有很大的权利,他们随时都可以了解corporate(在此处是Leh,Wamu等银行)的运营及资产情况。可是如果是因为他们没有正确的评估corporate的情况,承担了风险导致抵债的资产不值一文而不自知,那么又能怪谁呢?


至于是否他们借出去的1块后来是否值6毛,他们是可以通过court来解决的。这个不是教授的论点。这个政府和这些权威机构执行时的具体举措并没有在教授的文章里讨论。


 

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2008-10-10 23:59:00

咦,这个分行好奇怪啊!
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2008-10-11 12:35:00

以下是引用Caffeine在2008-10-11 11:56:00的发言:

mm说的权威是什么?
depositors are not bond holders. depositors are protected by FDIC.  I guess that it helps if I show the process here:
banks insolvent, failed->seized by FDIC->FDIC is asset owner->FDIC pay all insured depositors->FDIC sell assets (liquidation)
in this process depositors and bond holders are separated. depositors are taken care of by FDIC. Bond holders are taken care of by the court.

All I"m saying is that, without the bail out plan, there won't be any orderly bank failures. I don't think that the professor understands it. In theory he is correct, but he doesn't know how to execute. Not only he failed to recognize it, Paul Krugman failed to recognize it too(there was a debate on CNBC). It's not something people in academia understand I guess. They try to figure out a theory as to how problems can be solved, but people in business needs to consider all ramifications.

 


我说的权威就是那些主持分赃的authorities啊,包括Threasury, FED, FDIC, etc.


 


Depositors当然不被称作bond holder啦,但是他们first lien creditors. 并不是所有的deposit都有保险的。那部分在10万以上(现在将会是25万)的deposit是一样要上破产法庭等候发落的。扯得太远了,我原来的意思是说不论如何,如果value被wipe了,那么bond一文不值也是可能的。至于wamu的case是否公平,俺就不知道了。


 


另外,我觉得我们没有争论一个焦点:我觉得教授不是说不该拿出钱来做一些特殊的举措。教授是说拿钱也许是对的,但是那个plan中的计划的举措却是大大的不可。计划中是要把MBS等的价格买上来,以使银行帐面上solvant。教授认为区区700B远远不够做这件事,而且这样做也不利于银行系统的健康发展。教授提议,可以用钱给相对健康的银行注资,让不健康的银行orderly的破产。我觉得理论上听上去公平正确,实行起来也比买MBS什么的实际啊。


 


mm要是一定认为教授毫无实践经验,纸上谈兵,我觉得为此再争辩也没什么太大意义。我觉得他说的很有道理。至少我被他说服了,可是没有被那个700B的plan说服。


 


不过和mm的这个讨论还是很好的,让俺的思路更清晰了。不知道其他人看这个帖子有没有一点收益?还是觉得我们的讨论很无聊


 

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